





































































































































































This paper assumes that a central bank commits itself to maintaining an inﬂation target
and then asks what measure of the inﬂation rate the central bank should use if it wants
to maximize economic stability. The paper ﬁrst formalizes this problem and examines its
microeconomic foundations. It then shows how the weight of a sector in the stability price
index depends on the sector’s characteristics, including size, cyclical sensitivity, sluggishness
of price adjustment, and magnitude of sectoral shocks. When a numerical illustration of the
problem is calibrated to U.S. data, one tentative conclusion is that the central bank should
use a price index that gives substantial weight to the level of nominal wages.
JEL: E42, E52, E58
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Non-technical summary
Over the past decade, many central banks around the world have adopted inflation targeting as a guide
for the conduct of monetary policy. In such a regime, the price level becomes the economy’s nominal
anchor, much as a monetary aggregate would be under a monetarist policy rule. Inflation targeting is
often viewed as a way to prevent the wild swings in monetary policy that were responsible for, or at
least complicit in, many of the macro-economic mistakes of the past. A central bank committed to
inflation targeting would likely have avoided both the big deflation during the Great Depression of the
1930s and the accelerating inflation of the 1970s (and thus the deep disinflationary recession that
followed).
This paper takes as its starting point that a central bank has adopted a regime of inflation targeting and
asks what measure of the inflation rate it should target. Our question might at first strike some readers
as odd. Measures of the overall price level, such as the consumer price index, are widely available and
have been amply studied by index-number theorists. Yet a price index designed to measure the cost of
living is not necessarily the best one to serve as a target for a monetary authority.
This issue is often implicit in discussions of monetary policy. Many economists pay close attention to
‘core inflation’, defined as inflation excluding certain volatile prices, such as food and energy prices.
Others suggest that commodity prices might be particularly good indicators because they are highly
responsive to changing economic conditions. Similarly, during the U.S. stock market boom of the
1990s, some economists called for FED tightening to dampen “asset price inflation”, suggesting that
the right index for monetary policy might include not only the prices of goods and services but asset
prices as well. Various monetary proposals can be viewed as inflation targeting with nonstandard price
index: The gold standard uses only the price of gold, and a fixed exchange rate uses only the price of a
foreign currency.
In this paper, we propose and explore an approach to choosing a price index for the central bank to
target. We are interested in finding the price index that, if kept on an assigned target, would lead to the
greatest stability in economic activity. This concept might be called the stability price index.
The key issue in the construction of any price index is the weights assigned to the prices from
different sectors of the economy. When constructing a price index to measure the cost of living, the
natural weights are the share of each good in the budget of typical consumer. When constructing a
price index for the monetary authority to target, additional concerns come into play: the cyclical
sensitivity of each sector, the proclivity of each sector to experience idiosyncratic shocks, and the speed
with which the prices in each sector respond to changing conditions. Our goal in this paper is to show
how the weights in a stability price index should depend on these sectoral characteristics.	
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Over the past decade, many central banks around the world have adopted inﬂation tar-
geting as a guide for the conduct of monetary policy. In such a regime, the price level
becomes the economy’s nominal anchor, much as a monetary aggregate would be under a
monetarist policy rule. Inﬂation targeting is often viewed as a way to prevent the wild
swings in monetary policy that were responsible for, or at least complicit in, many of the
macroeconomic mistakes of the past. A central bank committed to inﬂation targeting would
likely have avoided both the big deﬂation during the Great Depression of the 1930s and the
accelerating inﬂation of the 1970s (and thus the deep disinﬂationary recession that followed).
This paper takes as its starting point that a central bank has adopted a regime of inﬂation
targeting and asks what measure of the inﬂation rate it should target. Our question might
at ﬁrst strike some readers as odd. Measures of the overall price level, such as the consumer
price index, are widely available and have been amply studied by index-number theorists.
Yet a price index designed to measure the cost of living is not necessarily the best one to
serve as a target for a monetary authority.
This issue is often implicit in discussions of monetary policy. Many economists pay close
attention to “core inﬂation,” deﬁned as inﬂation excluding certain volatile prices, such as
food and energy prices. Others suggest that commodity prices might be particularly good
indicators because they are highly responsive to changing economic conditions. Similarly,
during the U.S. stock market boom of the 1990s, some economists called for Fed tightening
to dampen “asset price inﬂation,” suggesting that the right index for monetary policy might
include not only the prices of goods and services but asset prices as well. Various monetary
proposals can be viewed as inﬂation targeting with a nonstandard price index: The gold
standard uses only the price of gold, and a ﬁxed exchange rate uses only the price of a
foreign currency.
Some formal models also indicate that monetary policymakers should use an index other
than the CPI. Phelps (1978) and Mankiw and Reis (2001b) propose that the central bank
target the nominal wage and allow the price of goods and services to move with supply
shocks, such as changes in productivity. Aoki (2001) examines a model with two sectors
— one with sticky prices and one with ﬂexible prices — and concludes that monetary policy
should target inﬂation in the sticky-price sector.	
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In this paper, we propose and explore an approach to choosing a price index for the
central bank to target. We are interested in ﬁnding the price index that, if kept on an
assigned target, would lead to the greatest stability in economic activity. This concept
might be called the stability price index.
The key issue in the construction of any price index is the weights assigned to the prices
from dierent sectors of the economy. When constructing a price index to measure the cost
of living, the natural weights are the share of each good in the budget of typical consumer.
When constructing a price index for the monetary authority to target, additional concerns
come into play: the cyclical sensitivity of each sector, the proclivity of each sector to expe-
r i e n c ei d i o s y n c r a t i cs h o c k s ,a n dt h es p e e dw i t hw h i c ht h ep r i c e si ne a c hs e c t o rr e s p o n dt o
changing conditions.
Our goal in this paper is to show how the weights in a stability price index should
depend on these sectoral characteristics. Section 1 sets up the problem. Section 2 examines
the microeconomic foundations for the problem set forth in Section 1. Section 3 presents and
discusses the analytic solution for the special case with only two sectors. Section 4 presents
a more realistic numerical illustration, which we calibrate with plausible parameter values
for the U.S. economy. One tentative conclusion is that the stability price index should give
a substantial weight to the level of nominal wages.
1 The Optimal Price Index: Statement of the Problem
Here we develop a framework to examine the optimal choice of a price index. To keep things
simple, the model includes only a single period of time. The central bank is committed to
inﬂation targeting in the following sense: Before the shocks are realized, the central bank
must choose a price index and commit itself to keeping that index on target.
The model includes many sectoral prices, which dier according to four characteristics.
(1) Sectors dier in their budget share and thus the weight their prices receive in a standard
price index. (2) In some sectors equilibrium prices are highly sensitive to the business cycle,
while in other sectors equilibrium prices are less cyclical. (3) Some sectors experience large
idiosyncratic shocks, while other sectors do not. (4) Some prices are ﬂexible, while others	
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are sluggish in responding to changing economic conditions.
To formalize these sectoral dierences, we borrow from the so-called “new Keynesian”




k = p + kky + 0k (1)
where, with all variables expressed in logs, pW
k is the equilibrium price in sector k, p is the
price level as conventionally measured (such as the CPI), kk is the sensitivity of sector k’s
equilibrium price to the business cycle, y is output (or some other measure of economic
activity), and 0k is an idiosyncratic shock to sector k with variance j2
k.T h i se q u a t i o ns a y s
only that the equilibrium relative price in a sector depends on the state of the business cycle
and some other shock. Sectors can dier in their sensitivities to the cycle and in the variances
of their idiosyncratic shocks.
In Section 2 we examine some possible microeconomic foundations for this model, but
some readers may be familiar with the equation for the equilibrium price from the literature
on price setting under monopolistic competition.1 The index p represents the nominal vari-
able that shifts both demand and costs, and thus the equilibrium prices, in all the sectors.






where wk are the weights of dierent sectors in the typical consumer’s budget. Economic
activity y aects the equilibrium price by its inﬂuence on marginal cost and on the pricing
power of ﬁrms. One interpretation of the shocks 0k is that they represent changes in the
degree of competition in sector k. The formation of an oil cartel, for instance, would be
represented by a positive value of 0k in the oil sector.
Sectors may also have sluggish prices. We model the sluggish adjustment by assuming
1For a textbook treatment, see Romer (2001, equation 6.45).	
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that some fraction of prices in a sector are predetermined. One rationale for this approach,
following Fischer (1977), is that some prices are set in advance by nominal contracts. An
alternative rationale, following Mankiw and Reis (2001a), is that price setters are slow to
update their plans because there are costs to acquiring or processing information. In either
case, the key feature for the purpose at hand is that some prices in the economy are set
based on old information and do not respond immediately to changing circumstances.
Let bk be the fraction of the price setters in sector k that set their prices based on updated
information, while 1bk set prices based on old plans and outdated information. Thus, the
price in period t is determined by
pk = bkp
W
k +( 1 bk)E(p
W
k). (2)
The parameter bk measures how sluggish prices are in sector k. The smaller is bk,t h el e s s
responsive actual prices are to news about equilibrium prices. As bk approaches one, the
sector approaches the classical benchmark where actual and equilibrium prices are always
the same.
The central bank is assumed to be committed to targeting inﬂation. That is, the central
bank will keep a weighted average of sectoral prices at a given level, which we can set equal








We will call {/k}t h et a r g e tw e i g h t sa n d{ wk} the consumption weights. The target weights
are choice variables of the central bank. The sectoral characteristics (wk, kk, bk,a n dj2
k)a r e
taken as exogenous.
We assume that the central bank dislikes volatility in economic activity. That is, its goal	
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is to minimize Va r (y). We abstract from the problem of monetary control by assuming that
the central bank can hit precisely whatever nominal target it chooses. The central question
of this paper is the choice of weights {/k} that will lead to greatest macroeconomic stability.























The central bank chooses the weights in its targeted price index in order to minimize output
volatility, given the constraints the economy imposes on the evolution of prices over time.
The solution to this problem will yield the set of weights /k in an optimal price index as
a function of sector characteristics, which include wk, kk, bk,a n dj2
k. We call the resulting
measure the stability price index, because it is the price index that, if kept on target, would
lead to the greatest possible stability in economic activity.2
2The central bank’s problem formalized here is more general than might be suggested by the way we have
described it. In particular, the variables pk can be interpreted more broadly than sectoral prices. Almost
any nominal variable in the economy whose equilibrium value moves one-for-one with the price level and in
response to the business cycle is a candidate. Examples include the monetary aggregates, nominal income,
and the exchange rate — three variables that have been suggested as targets for central banks. These variables
do not show up in a conventional price index (that is, k =0 ), but they can appear in the central bank’s
targeted index (that is, there is no reason to presume that $k =0 ). Thus, this framework can be viewed
broadly as a way of determining the optimal choice of a nominal anchor as a weighted average of many
nominal variables. The choice of an optimal price index for inﬂation targeting is a restricted application of
t h em o r eg e n e r a lp r o b l e m .
This framework could also be useful for a central bank in a monetary union deciding how to weight inﬂation
in dierent regions. Here, each “sector” is a national economy. For related work, see Benigno (2001).	
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At this point, there are two questions that might intrigue readers of this paper. What
are the microfoundations behind this problem? What is the solution to this problem? Those
interested in the ﬁrst question should continue on to Section 2. Those interested only in the
second question should jump to Section 3.
2 Some Microeconomic Foundations
In this section we build a general equilibrium model that delivers, in reduced form, the
problem presented in the previous section. We approach this task aiming for simplicity
rather than generality. We suspect that the stability-price-index problem, or some variant
of it, arises in settings more general than the one we examine here. Our goal now is to give
one example and, at the same time, to relate the stability-price-index problem to the large
new Keynesian literature on price adjustment.
2.1 The Economy Without Nominal Rigidities
The economy contains two types of agents—households and ﬁrms. The representative house-






There are many types of consumption goods. Following Spence (1976) and Dixit and Stiglitz
(1977), we model the household’s demand for these goods using a constant elasticity of
substitution (CES) aggregate. Final consumption C is a CES aggregate over the goods in















The parameter  measures the elasticity of substitution across the K sectors. The weights
wk sum to one and express the relative size of each sector.	
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Within each sector, there are many ﬁrms, represented by a continuum over the unit











Notice that, for simplicity, we have assumed that the elasticity of substitution is the same
across sectors and across ﬁrms within a sector.3







The household obtains income from supplying labor, which earns a nominal wage W,a n d
collecting proﬁts from all the ﬁrms, denoted . It spends all its income on the consumption
goods Cki.
From this household problem, we can derive the demand functions for each sector and




















3As is usual, there are two ways to interpret these CES aggregators. The more common approach is to
view them as representing consumers’ taste for variety. Alternatively, one can view C as the single ﬁnal good
that consumers buy and the CES aggregators as representing production functions for producing that ﬁnal
good from intermediate goods.
4For a derivation of these price indices, see either the original article by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) or a
textbook treatment, such as Obstfeld and Rogo (1996, p. 664).	
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The quantity demanded of the good produced by ﬁrm i in sector k is a function of its relative
price, Pki/P,w i t ha ne l a s t i c i t yo fd e m a n do f. It also depends on the sector size wk and
aggregate consumption C. In addition, we obtain this ﬁrst-order condition determining the





This equation, together with the budget constraint, determines the optimal choice of con-
sumption C and labor supply L.
Let’s now turn to the supply side of the goods market. We write the desired price of ﬁrm





The relative price of any good is a markup mk times the real marginal cost of producing
t h eg o o d . T h em a r k u pmk can capture many possible market structures from standard
monopoly (which here implies mk = /(  1)) to competition (mk =1 ). We allow mk to




where 0k is a random variable with mean µk and variance j2
k.T h ep a r a m e t e rk governs the
5Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) survey alternative theories of why markups may vary over the business
cycle. Steinsson (2002) examines how supply shocks might be modelled as exogenous ﬂuctuations in the
markup.	
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cyclical sensitivity of the markups in sector k, and it can be either positive or negative.
The production function takes the simple form Yki = Lki for all ﬁrms, so one unit of labor
in ﬁrm i in sector k produces one unit of output of that variety. Firms are assumed to hire
labor in a competitive market. Thus, the real marginal cost for every ﬁrm equals the real
wage.
We can now solve for the economy’s equilibrium. Using the ﬁrst-order condition (7), the
pricing equation (8), and the market-clearing condition that C = Y , we obtain the following
equation for the log of the equilibrium price:6
p
W
k = p + kky + 0k,
where kk = j+k. Note that this is the equation for the desired price posited in the previous
section. In this general equilibrium model, an increase in output inﬂuences equilibrium prices
both because it raises marginal cost and because it inﬂuences the markup. The supply shock
0k reﬂects stochastic ﬂuctuations in the markup in sector k.
It will prove convenient to have a log-linearized version of the aggregate price index.








wk exp((1  )pk)
!
.





This equation also corresponds to the problem stated in Section 1.
Using this linearized equation for the price level, and the expression for the equilibrium
prices in each sector, we can solve for the ﬂexible-price equilibrium as a function of the
6Since all ﬁrms in a sector are identical they all have the same desired price. The right hand side of the




parameters and shocks. If pk = pW








The equilibrium level of output depends on a weighted average of the markups. The larger
the markups, the more distorted the economy, and the lower the equilibrium level of output.




wkkk, which depends on
P
wkµk,t h e
expected average markup in the economy.
2.2 The Economy With Nominal Rigidities
We now introduce nominal rigidities into the economy. We assume that although all ﬁrms
in sector k h a v et h es a m ed e s i r e dp r i c epW
k,o n l yaf r a c t i o nbk has updated information and
is able to set its actual price equal to its desired price. The remaining 1bk ﬁrms must set
their prices without current information and thus set their prices at E(pW
k).U s i n gal o g - l i n e a r




k +( 1 bk)E(p
W
k).
The sectoral price is a weighted average of the actual desired price and the expected desired
price. As we noted earlier, this kind of price rigidity can be justiﬁed on the basis on nominal
contracts as in Fischer (1977) or information lags as in Mankiw and Reis (2001a).
The equilibrium in this economy involves K +2key variables: all the sectoral prices pk
and the two aggregate variables p and y. The above equation for pk provides K equations
(once we substitute in for pW











We do not model how this target is achieved. That is, we do not model the transmission
mechanism between the instruments of monetary policy and the level of prices. Instead, our
focus is on the choice of a particular policy target, which here is represented by the weights
/k.
The choice of weights depends on the policymaker’s objective function. In this economy,
the obvious welfare measure is the utility of the representative household. Recalling that










where Y is deﬁned by the CES aggregator in equation (4). We can take a second-order





























where y =l o g ( Y ) and yki =l o g ( Yki). Expected utility depends on expected output, the
expected square of output, and the distribution of output across ﬁrms.
There are two ways to make the leap from this expression for expected utility to the
variance of output, the objective function that we posited in Section 1. One approach
is to take the limiting case in which the risk aversion parameter j is very large. In this
case, the E(y  E(y))2 term in equation (9) dominates expected utility. This fact, together
with the observation that the natural rate hypothesis holds in the linearized model (so Ey
is invariant to policy), implies the policymaker’s objective is to minimize the volatility in
economic activity. This is exactly what we assumed in Section 1.	
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A second approach is to take advantage of some features of the CES aggregator to solve
out for some of the terms in equation (9). We pursue this approach in Appendix 1. This
approach combines the ﬁrst-order logarithmic approximation of the behavioral model with
the second-order logarithmic approximation to the objective function and is thus related
to familiar linear-quadratic approximations. The accuracy of this approximation, however,
is an open question. Nonetheless, it also leads to the conclusion that the policymaker is
interested in minimizing the variance of output.
The bottom line from this analysis is that we can view the stability-price-index problem
stated in Section 1 as a reduced form of a model of price adjustment under monopolistic
competition. The canonical models in this literature assume symmetry across sectors in order
to keep the analysis simple (e.g., Blanchard and Kiyotaki, 1987; Ball and Romer, 1990). Yet
sectoral dierences are at the heart of our problem. Therefore, we have extended the analysis
to allow for a rich set of sectoral characteristics, which are described by the parameters wk,
kk, bk,a n dj2
k.
3 The Two-Sector Solution
























The central bank chooses a target price index to minimize output volatility, given the con-
straints imposed by the price-setting process.
To illustrate the nature of the solution, we now make the simplifying assumptions that
there are only two sectors (K =2 ), which we call sector A and sector B, and that the shocks
to each sector (0A and 0B) are uncorrelated. We also assume that kA and kB are both
nonnegative. Appendix 2 derives the solution to this special case. The conclusion is the









A + kAbB(1  bA)j2
B
.
Notice that the optimal target weight depends on all the sectoral characteristics and, in
general, need not be between zero and one.7
From this equation, we can derive several propositions that shed light on the nature of
the solution. We begin with a very special case.
Proposition 1 If the two sectors are identical (same wk, kk, bk,a n dj2
k), then the stability
price index gives them equal weight (/W
k =1 /2).
This result is not surprising, as it merely reﬂects the symmetry of the two sectors.
More interesting results arise when the sectoral characteristics (wk, kk, bk,a n dj2
k)v a r y .
Let’s start with the two characteristics that describe equilibrium prices.
Proposition 2 An increase in kk raises the optimal /k. That is, the more responsive
a sector is to the business cycle, the more weight that sector’s price should receive in the
stability price index.
Proposition 3 An increase in j2
k reduces the optimal /k. That is, the greater the magni-
tude of idiosyncratic shocks in a sector, the less weight that sector’s price should receive in
7This equation for the optimal target weight sheds light on the conclusion in Mankiw and Reis (2001b)
about the optimality of targeting the nominal wage. The theoretical model in that paper can be viewed as
a special case of the model here, including some strong restrictions on the parameter values. If sector A is
the labor market and sector B is the goods market, then the earlier model can be written in a form such
that A =1 , B =1 , B =0 ,a n d2
A =0 . In this special case, the equation for the optimal target weight
immediately implies that $
A =1 . Below, we conduct an empirical exercise using the prices of both goods
and labor, but we do not impose such strong ap r i o r irestrictions about their behavior.	
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the stability price index.
Propositions 2 and 3 both coincide with aspects of the conventional wisdom. When economists
point to commodity prices as a useful economic indicator for monetary policy, they usually
do so on the grounds that these prices are particularly responsive to the business cycle. The
index of leading indicators, for instance, includes the change in “sensitive materials prices.”
Proposition 2 can be used to justify this approach. At the same time, when economists
reduce the weight they give to certain sectors, as they do with food and energy sectors in
the computation of the core CPI, they do so on the grounds that these sectors are subject to
particularly large sector-speciﬁc shocks. Proposition 3 can be used to justify this approach.
Let’s now consider the eects of price sluggishness on the optimal target weights:
Proposition 4 If the optimal weight for a sector is not larger than 100 percent (/k  1),
then an increase in bk reduces the optimal /k. That is, the more ﬂexible a sector’s price,
the less weight that sector’s price should receive in the stability price index.
As p e c i a lc a s ei sn o t e w o r t h y :
Proposition 5 If the two sectors are identical in all respects except one has full price
ﬂexibility prices (same kk, wk,a n dj2
k but bA =1 , bB < 1), then the monetary authority
should target the price level in the sticky-price sector (/B =1 ).
This result is parallel to that presented by Aoki (2001). But the very strong conclusion
that the central bank should completely ignore the ﬂexible-price sector does not generalize
beyond the case of otherwise identical sectors. Even if a sector has fully ﬂexible prices, the
optimal target weight for that sector is in general nonzero.
The last sectoral characteristic to consider is wk, the weight that the sector receives in
the consumer price index.
Proposition 6 An increase in wk reduces the optimal /k.T h a ti s ,t h em o r ei m p o r t a n ta
price is in the consumer price index, the less weight that sector’s price should receive in the
stability price index.
This proposition is probably the least intuitive one. It illustrates that choosing a price index	
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to aim for economic stability is very dierent than choosing a price index to measure the
cost of living.
What is the intuition behind this surprising result? Under inﬂation targeting, undesirable
ﬂuctuations in output arise when there are shocks 0k to equilibrium prices, which the central
bank has to oset with monetary policy. The eect of a shock in sector k depends on the
consumption weight wk. The greater is the consumption weight, the more the shock feeds into
other prices in the economy, and the more disruptive it is. Thus, to minimize the disruptive
eect of a shock, a central bank should accommodate shocks to large sectors. Under inﬂation
targeting, such accommodation is possible by reducing the weight of the sector in the target
index. Hence, holding all the other parameters constant, sectors with a larger weight in the
consumption index should receive a smaller weight in the target index.
To sum up, the ideal sectoral prices for a central bank to monitor are those that are
highly sensitive to the economy (large kk), experience few sectoral shocks (small j2
k), have
very sluggish prices (low bk), and are relatively small in the aggregate price index (small wk).
4 Toward Implementation: An Example
The two-sector example considered in the previous section is useful for guiding intuition, but
if a central bank is to compute a stability price index, it will need to go beyond this simple
case. In this section, we take a small step toward a more realistic implementation of the
stability price index.
4.1 The Approach
We apply the model to annual data for the U.S. economy from 1957 to 2001. We examine four
sectoral prices: the price of food, the price of energy, the price of other goods and services,
and the level of nominal wages. The ﬁrst three prices are categories of the consumer price
index, while wages refer to compensation per hour in the business sector. All four come from
the Bureau of Labor and Statistics. For the level of economic activity y, we use the log of
real GDP, obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
A key question is how to assign parameters to these four sectors. We begin by noting	
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the following equation holds in the model:
pk  Epk = bk(p  Ep)+kkbk(y  Ey)+bk(0k  E0k) (10)
That is, the price surprise in sector k is related to the overall price surprise, the output
surprise, and the shock. To obtain these surprise variables, we regressed each of the variables
pk, p,a n dy on three of its own lags, a constant, and a time trend and took the residual.
These surprise variables are the data used in all subsequent calculations.
In principle, one should be able to obtain the parameters by estimating equation (10).
In practice, the identiﬁcation problem makes formal estimation di!cult. Shocks (such as an
energy price increase) will likely be correlated with the overall price level and the level of
economic activity. Finding appropriate instruments is a task we leave for future work. Here,
as a ﬁrst pass, we adopt a cruder approach that is akin to a back-of-the-envelope calculation.
For the parameter bk, which governs the degree of price sluggishness, we rely on bald,
but we hope realistic, assumptions. We assume the food and energy prices are completely
ﬂexible, so bk =1 . Other prices and wages are assumed to be equally sluggish. We set
bk =1 /2, indicating that half of price setters in these sectors base their prices based on
expected, rather than actual, economic conditions.
Another key parameter is kk, the sensitivity of desired prices to the level of economic
activity. We estimate this parameter by assuming that the 1982 economic downturn — the
so-called Volcker recession — was driven by monetary policy, rather than sectoral supply
shocks. Thus, we pick kk for each sector so that equation (10) without any residual holds
exactly for 1982. That is, we are using the price responses during the 1982 recession to
measure the cyclical sensitivity of sectoral prices.
With kk and bk,w ec a nc o m p u t eat i m es e r i e so f0k  E0k and, thus, its variance-
covariance matrix. Note that we do not assume that the shocks are uncorrelated across
sectors. The previous section made this assumption to obtain easily interpretable theoretical
results, but for a more realistic numerical exercise, it is better to use the actual covariances.
Thus, if there is some shock that inﬂuences desired prices in all sectors (for a given p and
y), this shock would show up in the variance-covariance matrix, including the o-diagonal	
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elements.
The last parameter is the consumption weight wk. We take this parameter from the
“relative importance” of each sector in the consumer price index as determined by the Bureau
of Labor Statistics. For nominal wages, wk is equal to zero, because nominal wages do not
appear in the consumer price index.
With all the parameters in hand, it is now a straightforward numerical exercise to ﬁnd
the set of target weights /k that solves the stability-price-index problem as set forth above.
Appendix 3 describes the algorithm.
4.2 The Results
Table 1 presents the results from this exercise. The last two columns present the results from
the optimization. The last column, denoted /c, imposes the constraint that all the sectoral
weights in the stability price index be nonnegative. The second to last column, denoted /u,
allows the possibility of negative weights. The substantive result is similar in the two cases:
The price index that the central bank should use to maximize economic stability gives most
of its weight to the level of nominal wages.
The intuition behind this result is easy to see. The value of kk for nominal wages is 0.25,
which is larger than the parameter for most other sectors. (This parameter value reﬂects the
well-known fact that real wages are procyclical.) The only other sector that exhibits such
a large value of kk is the energy sector. But the variance of shocks in the energy sector,
measured by Va r(0k), is very large, making it an undesirable sector for the stability price
index. The combination of high kk and low Va r(0k) makes nominal wages a particularly
useful addition to the stability price index.8
O n em i g h ts u s p e c tt h a tt h ez e r ov a l u eo fwk for nominal wages in the consumer price
index is largely responsible for the high value of /k in the stability price index. That turns
out not to be the case. Table 2 performs the same empirical exercise as in Table 1, but it
assumes that the economy’s true price index gives half its weight to nominal wages (that is,
8Indeed, if a better index of wages were available, it would likely be more procyclical, reinforcing our
conclusion. See Solon, Barsky, and Parker (1994) on how composition bias masks some of the procyclicality
of real wages.	
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p =0 .5w +0 .5cpi). Once again, the most important element of the stability price index is
the level of nominal wages.9
Two other striking results in Table 1 are the large weight on the price of food and the
large, negative weight on the price of goods other than food and energy. These results depend
crucially on the pattern of correlations among the estimated shocks. If these correlations
are set to zero, the target weights for food and other goods are much closer to zero (while
the target weight for nominal wages remains close to one). In light of this sensitivity, this
aspect of the results should be treated with caution. One clear lesson, however, is that the
variance-covariance matrix of the shocks is a key input into the optimal choice of a price
index.
Finally, it is worth noting that the gain in economic stability from targeting the stability
price index rather than the consumer price index is large. It is straightforward to calculate
the variance of output under each of the two policy rules. According to this model, moving
from a target for the consumer price index to a target for the stability price index reduces
the output variance by 57 percent (or by 52 percent with a nonnegativity constraint on the
weights). Thus, the central bank’s choice of a price index to monitor inﬂation is an issue of
substantial economic signiﬁcance.
9How is the approximate irrelevance of k here consistent with Proposition 6? The proposition examines
what happens to $k when k changes, holding constant other parameter values. But in this empirical
exercise, if we change the weight given to some sector in the price index p, we also change the estimated
values of k and the variance-covariance matrix of %k.	
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Table 1
Results of Empirical Illustration
Sector b k Va r(0) w /u /c
Energy 1.0 0.31 0.00287 0.07 0.09 0.02
Food 1.0 0.08 0.00024 0.15 0.43 0.23
Other Goods 0.5 0.09 0.00017 0.78 -0.84 0
Wages 0.5 0.25 0.00048 0 1.32 0.75




Energy 1.00 -0.29 0.21 -0.15
Food 1.00 -0.27 -0.03




Results with Alternative Price Index
Sector b k Va r(0) w /u /c
Energy 1.0 0.28 0.00327 0.03 0.06 0.01
Food 1.0 0.05 0.00030 0.08 0.35 0.21
Other Goods 0.5 0.06 0.00023 0.39 -0.61 0
Wages 0.5 0.22 0.00027 0.50 1.20 0.78




Energy 1.00 -0.01 0.43 -0.10
Food 1.00 0.03 -0.32
Other Goods 1.00 0.04
Wages 1.00	
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5C o n c l u s i o n
Economists have long realized that price indices designed to measure the cost of living may
not be the right ones for the purposes of conducting monetary policy. This intuitive insight
is behind the many attempts to measure “core inﬂation.” Yet, as Wynne (1999) notes in his
survey of the topic, the literature on core inﬂation has usually taken a statistical approach
without much basis in monetary theory. As a result, measures of core inﬂation often seem
like answers in search of well-posed questions.
T h ep r i c ei n d e xp r o p o s e di nt h i sp a p e rc a nb ev i e w e da sa na p p r o a c ht om e a s u r i n gc o r e
inﬂation that is grounded in the monetary theory of the business cycle. The stability price
index is the weighted average of prices that, if kept on target, leads to the greatest stability
in economic activity. The weights used to construct such a price index depend on sectoral
characteristics that dier markedly from those relevant for measuring the cost of living.
Calculating a stability price index is not an easy task. Measuring all the relevant sectoral
characteristics is an econometric challenge. Moreover, there are surely important dynamics in
the price-setting decision that we have omitted in our simple model. Yet, if the calculations
performed in this paper are indicative, the topic is well worth pursuing. The potential
improvement in macroeconomic stability from targeting the optimal price index, rather than
the consumer price index, appears large.
Our results suggest that a central bank should give substantial weight to the growth in
nominal wages when monitoring inﬂation. This conclusion follows from the fact that wages
are more cyclically sensitive than most other prices in the economy (which is another way
of stating the well-known fact that the real wage is procyclical). Moreover, compared to
other cyclically sensitive prices, wages are not subject to large idiosyncratic shocks. Thus, if
nominal wages are falling relative to other prices, it indicates a cyclical downturn, which in
turn calls for more aggressive monetary expansion. Conversely, when wages are rising faster
than other prices, targeting the stability price index requires tighter monetary policy than
does conventional inﬂation targeting.
An example of this phenomenon occurred in the United States during the second half of
the 1990s. Here are the U.S. inﬂation rates as measured by the consumer price index and	
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Consider how a monetary policymaker in 1998 would have reacted to these data. Under
conventional inﬂation targeting, inﬂation would have seemed very much in control, as the
CPI inﬂation rate of 1.5 percent was the lowest in many years. By contrast, a policymaker
trying to target a stability price index would have observed accelerating wage inﬂation. He
would have reacted by slowing money growth and raising interest rates (a policy move that in
fact occurred two years later). Would such attention to a stability price index have restrained
the exuberance of the 1990s boom and avoided the recession that began the next decade?
There is no way to know for sure, but the hypothesis is intriguing.	
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Appendix 1 - Approximation of the utility function
In this appendix, following Woodford (2002), we derive the objective function of the
policymaker as a Taylor 2nd order log-linear approximation of the utility function.
The ﬁrst issue to address is the choice of the point around which to linearize. A natural
choice is the expected equilibrium in the economy. Yet, as Woodford discusses, it is impor-
tant for the accuracy of the log-linearization that this is also close enough to the e!cient
equilibrium of the economy. To ensure this is the case, we assume the average markup is
zero for all sectors: µk =0 . One way to make this consistent with the monopolistic com-
petition model is to introduce a production subsidy to ﬁrms funded by lump-sum taxes on
consumers10.
We start by deriving the expected equilibrium. Taking expectations of equation (2)
combined with equation (1), the expected price in each sector is:
Epk = Ep+ kkEy. (A.1)
Multiplying both sides by the weight of sector k in the overall price index wk, and adding up
across sectors, we obtain:









Ep. The ﬁrst result then follows that the expected value of output is equal to zero:
E(y)=0 .
Using the policy rule in equation (3) we ﬁnd the expected price level in the economy E(p)=0 ,
and using equation (A.1) the expected price in each sector is Epk =0 . Finally using the
demand functions in equation (6), expected output in each ﬁrm and sector is:
10Alternatively we could allow the markups to be of ﬁrst or higher stochastic order.	
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E(yki)=E(yk)=l o g ( wk)
It is important to note that the economy respects the natural rate property — all the expected
output variables (E(y),E (yki),E (yk)) are independent of monetary policy (/k), and so are
beyond the control of the policymaker












We approximate each of its two additive components in term.
On the ﬁrst term, a 2nd order linear approximation of y around its expected value E(y)=































The last approximation involves dropping a term that enters the expression additively and
which the policymaker can not aect, and which therefore does not inﬂuence the results from
the optimization.
As for the second term, we also approximate it using a Taylor 2nd order approximation
of the log of its components around their expected value. We do this in three steps, (1)
approximating each ﬁrm’s output around its expected value, (2) adding up within sectors,
and then (3) adding up across sectors. The log linear approximation of Yki around the	
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where the last line involves again dropping terms beyond the control of the policymaker, and
a hat over a variable denotes the deviation from its expected value: ˆ yki = yki  log(wk).















Introducing the notation Ei(ˆ yki) to stand for the cross sectional average of output across
ﬁrms in sector k, Ei(ˆ yki)=
R 1













To ﬁnd what these cross-sectional averages are, we use the market clearing condition Ck = Yk,









and approximate both sides in turn. Starting with the left-hand side we approximate it with
respect to yk around the point E(yk)=l o g ( wk):
e
31





































To approximate the right hand side, we start by approximating each of the terms in the	
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We can then use this to replace for the Eiˆ y2
ki term in our original linearization for Lk in























































In the last line, we introduce Ek(ˆ yk) to stand for the cross sectional average of output across
sectors, now weighted by the sectoral weights wk: Ek(ˆ yk)=
PK
k=1 wkˆ yk.U s i n g t h e C E S













we can approximate the left hand side around E(y):
e
31

























































































Returning to the original problem of approximating the utility function, we combine the
two terms of the utility function approximated in equations (A.2) and (A.5) to obtain our






































The policymaker wishes to minimize the unconditional variance of aggregate output.
Appendix 2 - Results for the two-sector case
In this appendix, we prove the results and propositions presented in section 3 of the text.
The optimal weights in the Stability Price Index
First, express all variables as deviations from their expected value. Letting a hat over




k =ˆ p + kkˆ y +ˆ 0k
ˆ pk = bkˆ p
W
k +( 1 bk)E(ˆ p
W
k)
ˆ p = wAˆ pA + wBˆ pB
0=/Aˆ pA + /Bˆ pB.
Next, we use the facts that (i) there are only 2 sectors in this application (k = A,B), (ii)
the expected value of any variable with a hat is zero, and (iii) the weights must sum to one,
to re-express the system as:
ˆ pA = bA(ˆ p + kAˆ y +ˆ 0A)
ˆ pB = bB (ˆ p + kBˆ y +ˆ 0B)
ˆ p = wAˆ pA +( 1 wA)ˆ pB
0=/Aˆ pA +( 1 /A)ˆ pB.
This is a system of 4 equations in 4 variables (ˆ pA, ˆ pB, ˆ p, ˆ y). Solving for the variable of interest
ˆ y, we obtain:
ˆ y = 
[/A + bB (wA  /A)]bAˆ 0A +[ ( 1 /A)  bA(wA  /A)]bBˆ 0B
kBbB + /A(kAbA  kBbB)+bAbB (/A  wA)(kB  kA)
The policymaker will then choose the weight /A in order to minimize the variance of the
















B is just given by /W
B =1 /W
A.
Proof of the Propositions
Proposition 1:U s i n gt h ev a l u e skA = kB, j2
A = j2
B, bA = bB, wA = wB =1 /2 in the
formula for /W
A above we ﬁnd that /W
A =1 /2.







B(1  wAbA  (1  wA)bB)
(kBbA(1  bB)j2
A + kA(1  bA)bBj2
B)
2
The denominator is clearly non-negative, and so is the numerator since bk  1 and wk  1,
so we can sign Y/W
A/YkA  0. By symmetry Y/W
B/YkB  0.







B(1  wAbA  (1  wA)bB)
(kBbA(1  bB)j2
A + kA(1  bA)bBj2
B)
2
which by the same argument as in the previous proposition, implies Y/W
A/Yj2
A  0 (and
Y/W
B/Yj2
B  0 symmetrically).
Proposition 4: Taking derivatives of /W











A + kA(1  bA)bBj2
B)
2 .




A  1 /
kBj
2





Therefore, as long as /W
A  1,t h e nY/W
A/YbA  0.B ys y m m e t r yi tf o l l o w st h a tY/W
B/YbB  0.
Proposition 5: Follows from evaluating the optimal solution /W




B, wA = wB =0 .5, bA =1 , bB < 1,t oo b t a i n/W
A =0 .
Proposition 6: Taking derivatives of /W












which is negative. Clearly Y/W
B/YwB is also negative.
Appendix 3 - Multi-sector problems
In this appendix, we describe how to ﬁnd the optimal price index in a K sector problem
as in section 4 of the text. The algorithm has 3 steps. First, we solve for the equilibrium
output in the economy, by solving the set of K +2equations:









in K +2variables (ˆ y, ˆ p,a n dt h eˆ pk), for the variable ˆ y, in terms of the parameters and the
innovations ˆ 0k. Second, we take the unconditional expectation of the square of ˆ y,t oo b t a i n
the variance of output as a function of kk, wk, bk, /k and the variances j2
k = E(ˆ 0
2
k) and




Given values for (kk, wk, bk,j2
k,jkj) the third step is to numerically minimize f(.) with respect
to the /k, subject to the constraint that
P
k /k =1 , and possibly additional non-negativity
constraints: /k  0.	
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